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1. Introduction and acknowledgements 
In 1974/75 various people at Oxford noticed that sheaves over complete Heyting 
algebras could be used to provide Heyting valued models for set theory entirely 
analogous to the Boolean valued models of Scott-Solovay. I tried then to put 
permutation models in a topos-theoretic context and came up with the interpre- 
tation of ZF in a Grothendieck topos described here. However, the sets and 
functions of a permutation model do not in general form a Grothendieck topos. My 
interest was reawakened by Peter Freyd’s recent construction of a topos in which a 
countable subset of r.?(N) fails to have a choice function. It was while trying to 
understand this model that I saw how to make explicit the logical relationship 
between topoi of continuous G-sets and the permutation models. Many people have 
had the chance to influence my thoughts on this subject meanwhile. I am grateful to 
all of them, in particular, thanks go to Peter Freyd, Robin Gandy, Robin Grayson, 
Martin Hyland and Dana Scott. 
The purpose of this paper is to show how topos-theoretic methods may be used to 
show the independence of various principles from the axioms of ZF set theory. 
These independence results are not new, nor are the methods we use (Boolean- 
valued models and permutation models). The only novelty here is a unified treat- 
ment of these techniques and their presentation as examples of constructions of 
independent mathematical interest. Freyd’s topos is also covered by our theory 
which shows how his construction can be used to give an independence result for 
ZF. This topos is not obviously equivalent to any of the classical models. 
Since the logic of topoi is in general intuitionistic, it is worth being precise about 
the form of the axioms for ZF we shall use. We shall deal with two theories, the 
familiar ZF and the less-familiar ZFA which allows atoms or urelemente. These are 
formulated in a single-sorted, first-order language with equality =, a binary 
membership relation E and a constant A for the set of afoms. The logic underlying 
our discussion will be Heyting’s intuitionistic predicate calculus [4]. Of course, we 
* Partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant MCS 7747660, and by the Science 
Research Council. 
91 
92 ,M. P. Fourman 
shall also consider classical interpretations. The axioms of ZFA are: (Writexe S for 
7xEA “x is a set”.) 
Decidability vx (XEAV-,XEA). 
Sets Vy(3x*xEy+y&S). 
Extensionality Vx,ye S [x=y*Vz (zEx+-2Ey)). 
Pairing Vx,y 32 (XEZAYEZ). 
Separation vx 3Y&S Vz (zEy*zExA(D), x not free in fp. 
Unions vx 3y vz(zEy++3wEx*ZEw). 
Power-set vx 3y vz (zEy_vwEZ l WEX). 
Infinity 3x(3y*yEXAVyEX* 3wEx*yEw). 
E-induction vx (Vyex* $4_v)+~(x))-‘vx*~(x). 
Collection VX(V’yEX 3w*p-3; VYEX 3WEc”V). 
ZF is the theory with the additional axiom 
A=0 v’x l x E s. 
2. Interpreting ZFA in a Grothendieck topos 
Lawvere first saw the possibility of interpreting higher-order logic in a topos [9]. 
Various formalisations of this idea have been given, using topoi to provide interpre- 
tations for intuitionistic type-theory [2,5,8]. Set-theory differs from type-theory in 
that it allows unbounded quantification. Furthermore, the set-theoretical axioms of 
replacement or collection, which say that certain unbounded quantifiers may be 
bounded, have no analogues in type theory. Previous treatments of topoi and set- 
theory have considered ZO, Zermelo set-theory (lacking collection or replacement) 
with do-separation (only bounded quantifiers allowed in cp) [3,8]. Here we see how, 
in a locally small, complete topos, we may adapt the interpretation of type theory to 
deal with unbounded quantifiers. (Note that, by complefe, we mean that all small 
inverse and direct limits exist.) The idea is simple: we mimick the classical con- 
struction of the cumulative hierarchy. Since each V,(A) is an object, we can 
interpret the bounded quantifiers Vxe V,(A) and 3x& V,(A). We reduce arbitrary 
quantification to these bounded quantifiers by replacing 
and 
Vxcp by A{Vxe Vu(A)*(plaEOn) 
3xp by V{3xe Vcl(A)*pjaEOn}, 
using completeness to interpret these infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. We 
can do this because each horn-set [X,R] is a complete Heyting algebra. 
Whereas, in traditional set-theory, sets come with an E-structure and the 
definition of the cumulative hierarchy makes it cumulative, in a topos-theoretic 
context each object must be viewed as a collection of urelemente; any E-structure 
must be given explicitly. Level CI of our hierarchy will be an object V@(A) = A + 
So(A), the disjoint sum of the urelements and the sets of rank 5 (Y, equipped with an 
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E-structure en : V,(A) x&(A)-+Q which is extensional in the sense that the 
induced map &(A)+ .1’( V,(A)) is manic or, equivalently, 
EVx,yESa(A) [*Y=y++t/ZE V,(A) (ZEaX++ZEaY)], 
using the standard interpretation of logic in a topos [5]. For /Isa we will have an 
embedding i/3, : S&l)-S&l) which is functorial and continuous, that is SA(A)= 
lim a<;. S&4) for limit ordinals I.. Finally, the E-structure will be natural in cr. We 
procede by transfinite induction: 
S&4)=0, 
&+r(A)= ?(V,(A)) where V@l)=A+S&l), 
Si.(A ) = iii &(A ). 
At zero and limit stages the structure is obvious. At successor stages the map 
Ed : V&4) x&(A)--R induces, by hypothesis, an embedding iE+, : S&l)-+ 
S,+I(A) as required (it_, =i~oi~+, of course). Adding A to iE_, gives an 
embedding V,(A)4 V,- I(A) and so the evaluation gives rise to an extensional Ed+ I 
by existential quantification. 
R 
Naturality is immediate from this definition. By abuse of notation, we shall also 
write ca for the extension of this relation along the inclusion V,(A) x &(A)cI 
V,(A ) x V&A ). 
Now we define the interpretation of formulae of ZFA. Let cl be the extension of 
the language of set theory obtained by adding predicates .YE V,(A) and the corres- 
ponding bounded quantifiers VXE V,(A) and 3x& V&I), where UE On* is a non- 
zero ordinal. A typing of the variables of 11 is a map # : Var-+On*. The typing # is 
admissible for the formula CJJ if for every free occurrence of a variable x in a 
subformula of the type SE V,(A) we have #XI U. If # is admissible for q then so. 
obviously, is any greater typing (using the product partial order). VVe take only non- 
zero ordinals as types to avoid the (minor) complications associated with possibly 
empty domains [j, 81. 
Given L3 a finite sequence of distinct variables of r and a typing # of the 
variables, we define an object 
X(d,#)= x V*.,(A) 
I E my J
94 .M. P. Fourman 
This definition is obviously functorial in the typin g: if *.YZ #x for XE rng A then we 
have an inclusion 
r: : x(d,#)+ X(d,*), 
the product of the appropriate i;. Furthermore, if rng A c rng f then the product of 
projections gives a morphism 
7r;: X(l-,#)-+ X(Ll,#) 
again this is functorial and the i’s and n’s commute. These morphisms will be of 
technical use. We shall also need some morphisms to deal with substitution. If 
X,_YE rng A and #x= #y we define 
ly/XlJ,# : X(d \a*)- X(A,#) 
to be the diagonal map from the y coordinate to the x and y coordinates, and the 
identity in each other coordinate. The map true : A-R gives by adjointness the 
name of A, written ‘A 7 : l- VI(A). The name of A in Va(A) is given by 
composing with ih. We remark that, at successor stages, the name of A in V, + I(A) 
arises by adjointness from the classifier of the inclusion of A in V,(A). We write 
[A/x]~,t : x(d \x,#)-X(d,#) 
for the product of the name of A in V,,(A) with the identity. Given 9 a formula of 
_I , a sequence A containing the free variables of 9 and a typing # admissible for 9, 
we define a morphism 
U9UJ.# : x(n,#)-n 
natural in both A and #. In fact, we need only define I~]J.~ naturally for some 
enumeration of the free variables of 9 and for some cofinal collection of typings # , 
naturality then forces our hand for the rest. We use a self explanatory superscript 
notation to specify particular A, and # which assign prescribed types to the 
variables listed. 
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where VP and 3, are the Lawvere quantifications [9] along the projection 
p : X(d,#)-+ X(A \X,#). 
ilvx*(ooA,*= ayiXE ~cl(A)*~nA.#, 
Kh*cpU~,x= V,Ub V,(A)-rpU~,t, 
U~[A/xlUil\,t = [A/xl~,r~bL~,a!. 
By induction on the structure of 9 it is straightforward to show that this definition is 
natural in d and # and, furthermore, that it is natural with respect fo subsfitufion: 
Uca[r/xlLl \.r.* = [S~.~l~.#~U~il~ 
where r is either A or some variable free for x in 9. The following lemma is also easy 
to check. 
2.1. Lemma. if #xzor then 
[XE ~‘,(A)-,(D~J,. = true 
iff 
UVUA.. = true, 
where * agrees wifh # except, possibly, at x, and *(x) = a. Also 
03x- cpb.lt = 03~~ V,(A) l p~0.1.~ and 
IlVx l cpO-l.at = U’d’xe I/p(A) l qb.lt 
for some a, ,O dependent on # . 
We say that a formula 9 is valid in V(A), written V(A) EP iff [91~.~ = true for all 
A, # for which the ‘truth value’ is defined. By naturality, it suffices to check this 
for some enumeration of the free variables occurring, and some cofinal collection of 
typings. A rule is valid if it preserves validity. 
2.2. Lemma. The axioms and rules of Heyting’spropositional calculus [J] are valid, 
as are the following: 
(i) x=x, 
(ii) x=yA9[x/z]-9f_v/z], 
9 (iii) - 
9 (r/xl ’ 
(iv) 
XE V,(A)-9 all aEOn* 
9 
9 
(v) 
XE t’,(A)~9-+9 
~*VXE V,(A) l 9’ 
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(vi) 
XE V&I)r\cp-_W 
3X& V,(A) l v-w’ 
(vii) 
w-+Vxc V,(A) l (D all aEOn* 
W’V,‘x.(p 
(viii) 
3xe V,(A) l CD-W all (r~On* 
3X* (p-u/ 
(x) (p’w 
3x ’ p-y 
where, throughout, x is not free in q~. 
in a Boolean topos, the law of the excluded middle is also valid and classical ogic 
prevails. 
Proof. In any topos, Hom[X,Q] is a Heyting algebra [8]. Thus the axioms of 
intuitionistic propositional logic are valid and, furthermore, if l~lr= true and 
[v-t,~]r= true, then [wlr= true. This is not sufficient to establish the validity of 
modus ponens since w may contain fewer free variables than ~0. However, since, for 
a>O, each V,(A) has global support, each rr: is epic. Thus if FV(I,M) c rng d c rng r 
and we have [I,u]~= true, then ~I,U]A = true. Modus ponens is valid. 
Now we consider the rules above. (i) is obvious. (ii) and (iii) follow from the 
naturality of @I with respect to substitution, (iv) from the previous lemma. (v) and 
(vi) are the same as the rules describing VP and 3, as adjoints [for (v) first use the 
adjointness XE V,(A)r\y/-(D= V/+(X& V,JA)--+cp)]. (vii) and (viii) follow from the 
definition (by sups and infs) of unbounded quantification. Finally, (ix) and (x) are 
formal consequences of (iv) through (viii). G 
This lemma establishes the soundness of our interpretation for first-order 
(intuitionistic) logic. To check the validity of ZFA we shall need some more 
relations between the quantifiers and some type-theoretic properties of the hierarchy 
which we now state. 
2.3. Lemma. Thefollowing are valid in 
IC/+VXE V,(A) l rp for cr<L 
W’VX E V;.(A) l rp 
V(A): the rules 
and 3x& V,(A) l P-+W for a<A 
3X& Vj.(A) ’ P’W 
where A is a limit ordinal; and the formulae 
Cumulation Vxe V,(A) l x E V&l), where a ID. 
Ranking vxe V,+i(A) VY c_YEX+YE V,(A)). 
Comprehension 3xe V,+I(A) Vye V&l) (x~y-cp). 
Extensionality Vx, YE VII7 t(A) (x,y E S+(x= y*Vz E V&i)(z~x-ZE y))). 
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Proof. The rules and the first two formulae are immediate. The others are just the 
standard type-theoretical axioms which are well-known to be valid in any topos 
[2,5,8]. L: 
2.4. Theorem. V(A) t ZFA. 
Proof. Decidability and sets are immediate. Extensionality follows from the type- 
theoretic extensionality of the last lemma by first dropping the bound on z and then 
appealing to (vii) of Lemma 2.2. Pairing, separation, unions and power set all 
follow from cumulation, ranking and comprehension followed by 2.2 (vii). An easy 
induction shows that infinity is already valid at V,,* l(A) and a transfinite induction 
shows that E-induction is valid for each V,(A). Finally, for collection, let /? be such 
that 
(using Lemma l), then 
Now, using comprehension, we can show that 
!== 32 VW (WEZf-‘WE V/I(A)) 
and hence 
~VJYEX. 3w*f~1--+3z*VyEx* 3wE;*rpllil\y.z,#=true 
considering all # with #x=(Y we have (again by Lemma 1) 
~vxEV,(A)(~y~x~3w~cp-t3z.vy~x. 3WEZ*(D) 
but a is arbitrary and so collection holds. C 
To see how these interpretations compare with classical models for set theory, we 
look at some examples. 
3. Fraenkel-Mostowski models 
If G is a topological group, the continuous G-sets (sets with a G-action G x X+X 
continuous for the discrete topology on X) form a Boolean 2-valued Grothendieck 
topos. The subobject classifier is a two-element set, and the natural number object is 
o; in each case with trivial action. Exponents are calculated by taking those 
functions X4 Y whose stabilisers are open, where the G-action on functions is given 
by the requirement (zf)(rrx)= n(Jx) of equivariant evaluation. Thus (nf)x= 
nCf(n -lx)). The internally defined l-l or onto maps are given by taking the sub- 
objects consisting of l-l or onto functions externally. 
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3.1. Example. Let G be the group of those permutations of a countable set il such 
that no = a for all but finitely many a E A. We topologise G by letting the stabilisers 
of points of A be open. Thus, the subgroups 
HZ={n/n(a)=afora~e}. foreafiniresubsetofA, 
from a basis for the filter of open subgroups. Now A is an object in the topos E of 
continuous G-sets. Thus we have an interpretation satisfying ZFA with classical 
logic. We show that 
V(A)= “A is infinite and Dedekind finite”. 
Clearly, for each n, the collection of functions from [n] onto A is empty so E “A is 
infinite”. Furthermore, the internal collection of l-1 maps from IN to A is empty, 
since no 1-l functionf : o-A has open stabiliser. Thus E “A is Dedekind finite”. 
As a corollary, k’(A)= 1 AC. 
Joyal has pointed out that this topos classifies (in the sense described in [8], p. 
203) an infinite set with decidable equality. 
For a presentation of F-M models, we refer to Jech [7]. We now make the 
connection between these models and our interpretations precise. F-M models are 
described in terms of a normalfilfer of subgroups of a group G, of permutations of 
a set A, that is, a filter .F in the lattice of subgroups, containing the stabilisers of 
elements of A and closed under conjugation by elements of G. This data is 
equivalent to giving a topological group structure on G making its action on A 
continuous. The elements of the filter are the open subgroups. Working in ZF, we 
can construct a class model (M,e)=ZFA, with standard power sets, standard part 
isomorphic to (V, E) and A as set of urelements (see [7], p. 125). Any permutation of 
A extends to an e-permutation of M. Those elements of A4 which e-hereditarily have 
open stabiliser, form a model M(G, .F) I= ZFA, the Fraenkel-Mostowski model. In 
general, the category of sets and functions of this model is a non-Grothendieck 
topos. However, the category of those sets and functions of M stabilised by all of G 
is equivalent to the topos of continuous G-sets. 
3.2. Theorem. M(G, 7)~ cp iff V(A) E rp, Cfor v, a formula of ZFA). 
Proof. By induction on cz show that V,(A), constructed in the topos, is just the 
hereditarily stable sets of rank a over A with the action of G inherited from that on 
A. Then observe that the internal and external logics coincide. 0 
4. Boolean-valued models 
Here, the connection is more direct. Let C3 be a complete Boolean algebra. The 
sheaves for the canonical topology on iB form a Boolean topos Sh(lB) equivalent to 
the category of sets and functions (with [‘f is a function”0 = 1) of the Boolean- 
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valued universe Vr (see again Jech, p. 53). This equivalence was shown (in a more 
general form) by Higgs (unpublished). Taking A =0, the initial object, the usual 
Boolean-valued interpretation agrees with ours: 
4.1. Theorem. 1~1 I<B = bk,h(s)fOf q~ u senfence of ZFA. 
4.2. Example. Adding generic reals. Let A be a set. The set of forcing condifions 
P= {partial functions p : N xA -2 with finite domain} 
is partially ordered by the principle of more is less: psq iff p is an extension of q; 
and topologised by taking downwards closed subsets as opens. Taking B to be the 
algebra of regular opens of P, the category Sh(B) is just the topos of double 
negation sheaves on P. It classifies (in the sense of Joyal [8], p. 203) a collection 
{rUc Nl UEA ) of decidable subsets of N, generic in the sense that the map 
a-r0 : A-2’” lies in every standard dense open subset of the space of such maps 
(product of A copies of Cantor space). Here, standard means, for the topos- 
theorist, coming from the base topos via r*, and for the set-theorist, coming from 
the ground model via the inclusion “: V+ Vs. We use the word “universal” for 
what Joyal calls generic. Thus, the universal generic A-indexed family of decidable 
subsets of N lives in Sh-,(P). Being generic, this is a monomorphism ,4~2’” (in 
fact, universality is sufficient to ensure this). 
5. Symmetric extensions 
Here, we start with an example and then discuss the relation to the method of 
Scott (see Jech [7], p. 115). 
5.1. Example. Let [E be the Boolean topos of Example 3.1, continuous G-sets. 
Working in iE, we shall form a Boolean extension classifying a generic A-indexed 
family of decidable subsets of N as in Example 4.2. We claim that in this extension, 
[E(B) there is no map f : N-A with infinite range. There was no such map in IE, 
however care is needed since we can add new maps in extensions. We work for the 
most part in IE. Remember, for the times when we descend to the real world (= base 
topos, = ground model), that any object of IE (hence any collection we define in the 
course of our argument) has a G-action, the stabiliser of each element being open. 
Furthermore, any morphism of E (hence any map we. define explicitly) is G- 
equivariant. The Boolean algebra B is defined internally from the set A, and so has 
its own G-action built in. In fact, we need only the G-action on the poset P of 
forcing conditions. This is given by (np)(n, a) =p(n, n-‘(a)) (defined just when the 
right-hand side is). So to work, suppose 
q E [f : N -+A has infinite range]. 
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Let Hr C sym(f). Now for some a I$ e, some i E N and some p s q we must have 
pc [f(i) =ai, as e is finite. 
Let a’# a be neither mentioned by p, nor an element of e. Let 71 permute a with a’. 
As the Boolean valuation is explicitly defined in E, we have 
np c InCf(i)) = 7raO 
so rep E If(i) = a’l, as n E He C_ sym(/). But p and up are compatible qua functions so 
they have a joint extension p l np. But p l np 5 q and 
p l up E if is not a function0 
which contradicts our assumption. Since A -2‘., this shows that in IE(B) we have an 
infinite, Dedekind-finite subset of 2”.. This subset appears in V(0), so that 
V(0) I= ZFC -4C. 
The reader will recognise this as the usual BVM proof in mild disguise (cf. [7], p. 
117). We now see how our method may be used to deal with symmetric extensions in 
general. Let a topological group G act by automorphisms on the cBa B. The 
symmetric elements of 5, those with open stabilisers, need not form a complete 
Boolean algebra, looked at from our ordinary standpoint. We need rose-coloured 
spectacles. 
5.2. Lemma. The symmetric elements of B form a cBa, LBG in the topos E of 
continuous G-sets. 
Proof. For each H-stable subset Xof B, the supremum VX is H-stable. C 
Thus, we can construct a Boolean extension E(ZG) of E. Now, if G is a topological 
group acting on the cBa [B by automorphisms, let q be the symmetric extension 
consisting of hereditarily stable elements of V’. Take A = 0. 
5.3. Theorem. @I,,= BrpU~(sc,for (p a sentence of ZF. 
Proof. A transfinite induction shows that the Va(0) merely reproduce the 
cumulative hierarchy of the symmetric extension. The result is then proved by 
induction on the structure of (P. Cl 
6. A question 
Call a topos localic over continuous G-sets, a symmetric extension. It seems 
unlikely that even every Boolean, Crothendieck topos arises as a symmetric 
extension. (Although, Joyal and Tierney’s recent representation of any Grothen- 
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dieck topos as sheaves on a localic groupoid seems to narrow the range of possible 
topoi dramatically.) So, are there any other topoi? Do they provide new models for 
set-theory? In particular, is there a Boolean, Grothendieck topos whose standard 
part, V(0) has a theory different from that of any symmetric extension? 
7. Postscripta (added in proof) 
Freyd has answered the questions of Section 6. There are topoi which are not 
symmetric extensions. However, every Grothendieck topos may be logically 
embedded in some symmetric extension (in fact in some localic extension of the 
topos of continuous G-sets described in 3.1). Thus the answer to our last question is, 
“No”. 
Scott [13] gives a concrete presentation of our interpretation, in the case of a 
presheaf topos, which requires no background in topos theory. 
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